Understanding the differences between rich and poor places is complicated by the fact that places differ from each other in numerous ways. In this paper, we show how a dimension reduction algorithm can unveil hidden patterns in US census data and consistently yield useful insights into the type of economic activities that separate rich and poor states over 160 years of development history. Moreover, we find this approach has a unique ability to shed light on the dynamics of evolving landscapes and changes in relevance of particular types of activities, such as the shift from manufacturing to high skill services that occurred in the US over the last 40 years. Our results have important implications for the decline of the rustbelt and the reversal of US regional income convergence from 1980 onwards.
Introduction
How can we better understand the differences between rich and poor places? A key challenge for economists and economic geographers alike is that places differ to each other in many ways. Take Massachusetts and Mississippi: One state has a strong employment concentration in high tech and financial services, while the other is more concentrated in agricultural activities. But they also differ in terms of their natural resources, military facilities, manufacturing industries and concentrations of retail outlets and religious organisations. How can we know whether some of these differences matter more for economic performance than others? And what if we wanted to compare more than two places? How might we analyse the differences between Massachusetts, Mississippi and Michigan -or the entire set of US states?
One way to overcome the high dimensionality of making such comparisons is to ignore the type of industries or occupations a place is concentrated in, and just examine the extent to which a place is more or less diversified. And indeed, the topic of specialisation vs diversification has received significant attention within the economic geography literature, with mixed findings in terms of the relationship with economic performance (Attaran, 1986; Quigley, 1998; Duranton and Puga, 2000; Kemeny and Storper, 2015) . More recently, scholars have suggested that when it comes to regional development, the 'what' might be more important than the 'scale' of specialisation (Kemeny and Storper, 2015; Martin et al., 2018) .
In this paper, we demonstrate an alternative methodology for analysing differences in employment concentrations across places. We draw on a dimension reduction algorithm that has been previously applied to country export data to calculate the country-based Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and product-based Product Complexity Index (PCI). This approach, which proved to be successful in explaining cross-country differences in per capita GDP and economic growth was originally advanced on the intuition that more prosperous places would be likely to export a large number of products that few other countries would be able to export (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009 ). However, the ECI was later shown to be mathematically unrelated to the number ('diversity') of products a country can export competitively (Kemp-Benedict, 2014) . Instead, the value of the ECI and PCI metrics was suggested to lie in their ability to reduce the high-dimensional space of country-export specialisations into two single-dimension vectors that best describe the similarities in the type of products that countries export (Mealy et al., 2017) .
As we discuss further in Section 2, the ECI provides an ordering that places countries with similar exports close together in the ranking, and those with dis-similar exports far apart. Analogous to the Dewey Decimal system for placing books with similar topics close together in library shelves, the ECI provides a useful way to arrange countries in terms of the similarity in what they export. The corresponding PCI index helps identify the type of exports that countries at either end of the ECI spectrum have in common. That is, it indicates what type of exports distinguish countries with high ECI scores from countries with low ECI scores. This paper investigates this new interpretation of the ECI and PCI metrics in the context of regional economic development. We apply the Hausmann et al. (2014) algorithm to US census data on industrial and occupational employment concentrations across US states over 160 years of development history. For all periods in which we have state income data (1880-2010), we find that this approach consistently provides useful insights into the types of industries and occupations that underpin places of higher (and lower) economic prosperity. Moreover, in congruence with results for country-export data (Hausmann et al., 2014) , we find these measures to be significantly predictive of future economic growth.
Applying this approach to census data over such a long time period also yields a further interesting discovery not yet documented in applications to country-export data: the ECI and PCI metrics appear to have a unique ability to capture the dynamics of evolving economic landscapes. Over the 1970-1980 period, the PCI of manufacturing activities declines substantially, while high skill services show a marked rise. It is important to stress that the dimension reduction algorithm takes in no information about types of industries or occupations, income or wages. It only operates on the pattern of employment concentrations across US states. However, this pattern turns out to be surprisingly informative of the changing relevance of particular types of specialisations in a given economic context. We show that this shift influences states' ECI trajectories in different ways. Although rust-belt states and eastern states had very similar ECI scores leading up to 1980 (suggesting they were specialised in similar types of activities), in 1980 the ECI of these two groups diverge -signalling very different future economic prospects. We find this new divergence between these groups of states is well explained by their differences in education, which were much higher in east coast states than in rust belt states. While educational differences did not strongly distinguish between states at either end of the ECI spectrum in previous periods, these differences have become particularly important for economic success in the new knowledge economy (Glaeser et al., 2014) .
Finally, we suggest that the dimension reduction tools described in this paper could provide a new, complementary analytical angle onto the reversal in the pattern of state income convergence that occurred from 1980 onwards. While this 'great inversion' has been studied from numerous standpoints (Storper, 2018) , we are not aware of literature that has explored income convergence through the lens of these dimensions reduction tools. Complementing the Krugman Index (or dissimilarity index) (Krugman, 1991 (Krugman, , 1993 , which has previously been applied to investigate regional income convergence (Kim, 1998; Martin et al., 2018) , we find the changes in the PCI and ECI over this period to be particularly informative of a new spatial divide separating US regions. Not only do we observe a bifurication in the PCI of manufacturing and high skill services over this period (Moretti, 2012) , we also observe the error bars on these mean values becoming much further apart, suggesting that these activities have become much more strongly spatially segregated. While investigating the drivers of regional income convergence is beyond the scope of this paper, these preliminary findings align with existing theories linking slowing regional convergence to the spatial segregation of skills, which have become increasingly concentrated in cities (Glaeser and Saiz, 2003; Berry and Glaeser, 2005; Moretti, 2012) .
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the ECI and PCI metrics and explains their use as dimension reduction tools. Section 3 describes the data and approach for applying the ECI and PCI metrics to state employment concentrations. Section 4, 5, 6 detail our results, and Section 7 concludes.
Understanding the ECI and PCI metrics as dimension reduction tools
The ECI and PCI metrics were originally introduced to infer information about cross-country differences in productive capabilities or 'know-how' from export data (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann et al., 2014) . Their calculation involves applying an algorithm to a binary country-product matrix M , with elements M cp indexed by country c and product p. M cp = 1 if country c has a 'revealed comparative advantage' (RCA) > 1 in product p and 0 otherwise. RCA is calculated using the Balassa (1965) index
where y c and y c represent the ECI scores of country c and c respectively, and d c denotes the diversity of country c. That is, the ECI vector is the exact solution to the problem of assigning real numbers y c to each country c to minimise the sum of the squared the distances between countries, where distances are weighted by the similarity matrix S. The constraint c y c d c = 0 forces country ECI scores to take on positive and negative values, and to have a fairly balanced distribution above and below zero.
1 From this perspective, we can see that countries with high ECI scores have similar types of exports to countries with other high ECI scores, and dis-similar types of exports to countries with low ECI scores.
The associated PCI measure, which is symmetrically defined as the eigenvector associated with the second largest eigenvalue of the transpose of the M matrix, helps us identify the types of products that countries at one end of the ECI spectrum have in common. Products with high (low) PCI scores are more likely to be exported by countries with high (low) ECI scores, and less likely to be exported by countries with low (high) ECI scores.
In Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) and Hausmann et al. (2014) , it was shown that countries with high ECI scores tend to be advanced countries that are more likely to export technologically sophisticated ('complex') products, while countries with low ECI scores tend to be less developed countries that tend to export less technologically sophisticated products. As such, the application of the ECI and PCI measures to country-trade data offers strong empirical support for developmental theories based on 'technological capabilities' (Lall, 1992 (Lall, , 2000 Lall et al., 2006; Sutton and Trefler, 2016) , which contend that countries possessing more advanced technological capabilities are more likely to grow and prosper.
Application to US States: 1850-2010
Can the interpretation of ECI and PCI as dimension reduction tools give us new insights to regional development in the US? We explore this question by drawing on US census data over the period 1850-2010 from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al., 2017) .
IPUMS provides decadal data on state employment in 3-digit industries and occupations. While regular changes in industry and occupation classification schemes have historically complicated longitudinal analysis, the IPUMS project has recoded census data into several sets of 'standardised' occupation classification schemes.
We draw on the IND1950 and OCC1950 codes (based on the US Census 1950 classification scheme) to analyse the 1850-1950 period, the OCC1990 and IND1990 codes to analyse the 1950-1990 period and the OCC2010 and IND2010 codes to analyse the 2000-2010 period.
2 Unfortunately the 1890 period is missing due to a fire that destroyed these records. We also omit the year 1940 due to significant data inconsistencies (most likely due to the Second World War.)
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To apply the Hausmann et al. (2014) algorithm to the IPUMS data, we first construct binary matrices W of state employment concentrations for each time period. These matrices are analogous to the binary M country-product matrix for export data. We calculate separate W matrices for state industrial employment concentrations (based on the harmonised IND codes) and state occupational employment concentrations (based on the harmonised OCC codes).
Each element W si relates to a state's location quotient in industry or occupation i, given by
where e si is the number of people employed in industry or occupation i in state s. Analogous to the approach taken for country-export data, we let W si = 1 if LQ si > 1 and LQ si = 0 otherwise.
We then define W as
where D −1 is the diagonal matrix formed from the diversity vector d s = i W si of state employment concentrations (i.e the row sums of W ) and S is a symmetric state similarity matrix whose rows and columns correspond to states, and whose entries are given by The SIC (and SOC) indices for states are analogous to the ECI for countries based on export data. They give a one-dimensional ranking of states that places states with similar types of industrial (occupational) employment concentrations close to each other in the ordering and states with di-similar employment concentrations far apart. The IC (and OC) indices for industries (and occupations) are similarly analogous to the PCI index for exported products.
Explaining Differences in Economic Prosperity
In this section, we explore the relationship between the SIC and SOC indices and state per capita income over all periods for which we have income data. As the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measure was only developed in the 1960s, we draw on estimates of state personal income per capita from Easterlin (1960) , US Department of Commerce (1962) and Klein (2013) for the earlier 1880-1950 years. We unfortunately do not have income data for the 1850-1870 period. More information about these income sources and the differences between state personal income and state GDP can be found in Appendix A.1. In Table 1 , we examine the relationship between the indices and state per capita income. Model (1) and (2) regress state per capita income on the SOC index (with and without state fixed effects), Model (3) and (4) perform the same analysis with the SIC index, and Model (5) and (6) include both SIC and SOC variables in the regression. While the SIC and SOC indices are both strongly positively correlated with state per capita income over the 1880-2010 period, we find that the SOC index consistently has a slightly greater ability to explain variance in state per capita income than the SIC index.
We suggest two possible reasons for the comparably stronger association between the SOC index and state per capita income. In the periods prior to 1910 the US census only asked respondents to report their occupation -no separate industry question was posed. While it is usually straightforward to infer the appropriate industry form the occupational response, in some cases it is less clear. As such, industry coding for these earlier periods is less precise (Rondander, 1999) . However, the stronger relationship between the SOC index and income per capita is not only limited to the period prior to 1910; we find this pattern to extend over the entire 1880-2010 period.
A second possible reason which could explain this phenomenon in the later years is the evolution from sectoral to functional specialisation. Rather than being home to an industry's entire value chain, cities and regions have experienced an increasing tendency to be specialised in functions (Duranton and Puga, 2005; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2009 ) (or even tasks (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) ), with firms locating management and administrative headquarters in larger cities and plants or production activities in other areas. As such, the SOC index based on state occupational employment concentrations may better capture this spatial separation of activities along the industrial value chain. From this perspective, the index's closer alignment with per capita income could suggest that functional, rather than sectoral specialisations have stronger implications for a region's average level of economic prosperity.
4 For these reasons, we focus the most of the analysis in the remainder of this paper on the SOC index.
It is important to highlight that the high adjusted R 2 is primarily driven by the inclusion of the year fixed effects, which alone account for 97.3% of the variance in state per capita income. However, without year fixed effects, the SOC index alone still captures a fairly large proportion of the variance in state per capita income. As shown in the year-on-year correlations in Figure 1 , the SOC index consistently accounts for at least 24% of the variance in state per capita income over the 1880-2010 period, and in some years explains up to 86%.
In Table 2 , we also test whether the close association between the SOC index and state per capita income is robust to a number of controls. We find that the relationship remains strongly significant, even with the inclusion of variables relating to state population, occupational diversity (d s ) and each state's proportion of overseas and interstate workforce. Population, overseas and interstate workforce data are also drawn from the IPUMS database (Ruggles et al., 2017) . Proportion of overseas and interstate workforce statistics are calculated on the basis of the IPUMS 'Birthplace' variable, which indicates the US state or foreign country in which a worker was born. Table 3 explores the relationship between a state's SOC index, and its future economic growth rate. In Model (1), we regress states' decadal compound annual growth rate against their SOC scores and control for their initial level of per capita income. We find that states with higher SOC tend to have higher future growth rates. In Models (2), (3) and (4), we show that this result is also robust to a series of control variables. Let us pause briefly to digest what these regression results mean in light of our interpretation of the SOC index as a one-dimensional ordering that places states with similar types of occupational specialisations close together in the ranking and those with dis-similar types of occupational specialisations far apart. The strong and robust relationship between the SOC index and state per capita income portrayed in Table 2 suggests that over the 1880-2010 period, states with similar types of occupational concentrations tend to have similar levels of per capita income.
This finding is, in a sense, both trivial and profound. It is trivial if one considers it in the two-region setting. Imagine two states that had identical economic structures. It would probably be fairly surprising if they didn't have very similar levels of per capita income. Now imagine 51 states with economic structures having varying degrees of similarities. It is not immediately obvious that if you collapse this high dimensional space of state occupational specialisations into a single ordering reflecting relative state similarities, this sequence would correlate so strongly with the ordering of state per capita income. And yet, this result holds over the 130 year period for which we have state income data.
Returning to our two-region setting -suppose we did find two states that had identical economic structures, but different levels of per capita income. Most economists would expect some degree of convergence in incomes -the state with lower per capita income should be likely to grow relatively faster, and 'catch up' with the living standards enjoyed by the other state (see for example Kim (1998) 
Shannon's entropy treats state employment shares as a probability distribution and calculates the degree of uncertainty that a given worker in a state will be employed in a particular occupation
For each of these measures, higher (lower) values indicate greater (lesser) state employment diversification. As shown in Figure 1 , states with higher diversification tended to have higher levels of per capita income up to around 1960. However, this association starts breaking down from 1970 onwards. In contrast, the SOC index continues to be strongly positively correlated with state per capita income over the entire 1880-2010 period. This suggests that over time (most likely due to reductions in transport and communication costs (Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998; Glaeser and Ponzetto, 2007; Michaels, 2008; Michaels et al., 2013; Leamer and Storper, 2014) ) the type of occupations states are specialised in has become more important in distinguishing between richer and poorer places. 
What separates rich and poor states?
Relative to poorer places, what type of occupations are richer places concentrated in? Recall from Section 2 that in the context of country-export data, the PCI metric helps us identify the types of products that countries at one end of the ECI spectrum have in common. In this section, we draw on the Occupational Complexity (OC) index to identify the types of occupations that states with high (low) SOC scores have in common.
It is important to emphasise that the tendency for places with high (low) SOC scores tend to be more (less) prosperous is not in-built into these metrics. The algorithm only operates on the binary pattern of state employment concentrations in the W matrix, and takes in no further information on income, wages, skill level, or occupational classification (such as agricultural, manufacturing or services). However, as we demonstrated in the previous section, the SOC index tends to consistently distinguish between states with higher and lower levels of incomeand this strong and robust result reflects the differences in the types of occupations concentrated in richer and poorer places.
To test this even further, we calculate a measure that explicitly captures an occupation's concentration in prosperous places. Inspired by the 'PRODY' incomecontent measure for exported products (Hausmann et al., 2007) , we calculate an Occupational Income Content (OccY ) measure, which calculates the average per capita income of states that have a LQ > 1 in a particular occupation. That is, for each occupation i, OccY i measures the average prosperity of states that are concentrated in it, and is given by
where W si relates to elements in the binary W matrix of state occupational concentrations, and Y s relates to the per capita income of state s. Figure 2 shows the Pearson R correlation coefficient for the year-on-year correlations between each occupation's OccY and Occupational Complexity index over the 1880-2010 period. This strong relationship is on par with the year-on-year correlations between SOC and state per capita income over the same period (see Figure 1 ), and provides further empirical evidence that the occupational differences separating rich and poor regions are well captured by the OC measure.
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In Appendix A.4, we show that this relationship is robust to a series of controls including occupational wage, educational requirement and total employment. In Table 4 , we show the highest and lowest ranked occupations in terms of their OC index for 2010. A cursory comparison of the top and bottom ranks suggests that, not surprisingly, prosperous places tend to be concentrated in high-skill services, while less prosperous places are underpinned by industrial activities. However, reflecting the surrounding ecosystem of activities that co-evolve with a region's tradable activities, a number of lower skilled occupations, such as baggage porters also occupy the top-ranks.
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While one might be tempted to refine the SOC and OC indices by activities that are typically non-traded from the W matrix, we show in Appendix A.6 that this reduces the ability of the SOC index to explain variance in state income per capita and predict future growth. The non-tradable supporting ecosystem of increasingly specialised activities turn out to be particularly important in distinguishing between rich and poor places. And indeed it is worth noting that even Adam Smith 
New insights into shifting economic landscapes
How has the type of occupations underpinning prosperous places has changed over time? And what implications might this have for long term regional development?
In this section we investigate the evolution of SOC and OC indices over the 1850-2010 period.
Examining the trajectory of detailed occupational OC scores over such a long time horizon is complicated by changes occurring in the harmonised occupational classification scheme in 1950-1960, and 1990-2010 . As detailed occupations across these classifications are not directly comparable, we look at the average OC values of detailed occupations falling into broader categories that we can compare across the entire period.
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In Figure 3 , we show the average OC scores of occupations falling into three broad categories: professional, technical and finance occupations (including management, scientific, financial and other professional and technical activities), service occupations (including retail and administrative activities) and production (construction, extraction and manufacturing) occupations. It is important to note that this distinct change does not reflect changes in the occupation classification (these changes occurred in over 1950-1960, and 1990-2000) . As we show in the Appendix, this structural shift in OC scores can also not be well accounted for by changes in occupational employment shares in these broad categories (as shown in Figure 13 , this evolution was much smoother). Moreover, a very similar shift is evident when analysing metropolitan (rather than state) level data (see Figure 12) , and when analysing industry complexity index scores (see Figure 11 ).
Before we digest the OC dynamics further, we first examine the corresponding evolution of state SOC scores over the 1850-2010 period. Why did the OC and rust-belt SOC scores experience such a significant shift in 1970-1980? This particular decade is historically interesting on a number of fronts. The 1973 oil-crisis, which led to a quadrupling of oil prices, severely impacted US automotive businesses that were concentrated in rust-belt states (Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993; Lee and Ni, 2002) . With higher fuel prices and severe gas shortages, domestic demand for 'gas gazzling' vehicles, which places like Detroit were famous for, shifted to more efficient models imported from Japan (Carrillo, 2004) . However, for states endowed with coal, oil and gas reserves, the oil-crisis generated a short-lived boom, as higher energy prices stimulated mining and drilling activities around the country (Black et al., 2005; Allcott and Keniston, 2017) .
At the same time, computers began proliferating the workforce -augmenting the productivity of higher skill occupations specialised in cognitive tasks and reducing demand for labour concentrated in routine and manual activities (Autor et al., 2003; Berger and Frey, 2016) . However, skill-biased technological change was not the only force impacting US labour markets. As highlighted by (Autor, 2015, p10) "Many forces distinguish the labour markets of these two epochs of 1940-1980 and 1980-2010 Heeding Autor's words, we do not attempt to identify causal channels for the changes in SOC and OC scores in this paper. However, we do seek to reflect on the insights that these metrics give us about the changes in the US economic landscape over this period.
As reflected by their high SOC scores, both rust-belt states and East-coast (and California) states were concentrated in relatively similar types of occupations in the period leading up to 1980. However in 1980, the SOC scores of these two groups of states diverge -signalling different future economic prospects for these states. The changes in OC scores in Figure 3 help identify the nature of these differences. East-coast states (and California) become much more concentrated in high-skill professional services, while rust-belt states remained largely specialised in manufacturing.
We stress again that the algorithm for calculating SOC and OC metrics is blind to the type (or classification) of occupations states are concentrated in -it only operates on the binary pattern of 1's and 0's in the W matrix and finds the direction in which states and occupations are maximally separated, in terms of the similarity in their employment concentrations. Yet this pattern of similarities appears particularly useful for identifying changes in relevance (or 'fitness') of particular activities for generating prosperity -without having any a priori theoretical intuition.
Why were the rust-belt states less able to transition to high-skill service activities like their East-coast counterparts? Figure 5 suggests that differences in education had a lot to do with it. 8 As shown in Panel A of Figure 5 , which plots 1970 SOC scores against 1970 average state educational attainment levels, education does not well separate states at either ends of the SOC spectrum. However, a different picture emerges in 1980. Panel B shows that 1980 SOC scores are well explained by differences in 1970 average state educational attainment levels. And, indeed as we show in Figure 6 , which shows the year-on-year Pearson correlation coefficient between the SOC index and average state educational attainment for all years education data is available, the relationship between the SOC index and statement education attainment shows a marked shift in 1980. While it comes as no surprise that in the new knowledge economy, education clearly matters -we find that the SOC and OC indices have a unique ability to pin-point what has become an increasingly important divide (Berry and Glaeser, 2005 ). One further important topic that these dimension tools could shed light on is regional income convergence. Although considerable economic disparities have long separated US states, throughout most of the 20th century poorer states were tending to grow faster relative to richer states (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) . However, this process slowed substantially from 1980 onwards. A number of scholars have suggested that this phenomenon could be underpinned by the increasing returns to skills and innovation, which have become much more concentrated in cities (Glaeser and Saiz, 2003; Berry and Glaeser, 2005) . As highlighted by Moretti (2012) , p 106,
"It is almost as if, starting in the 1980s, the American economy bifurcated. On the one side, cities with little human capital and traditional economies started experiencing diminishing returns and stiff competition from abroad. On the other, cities rich in human capital and economies based on knowledge-intensive sectors started seeing increasing returns and took full advantage of globalised markets."
Interestingly, this 'bifurification' is well captured by the OC and SOC dynamics over this period. In Figure 3 , not only do we observe a new polarisation of production and high skill services at either end of the PCI spectrum in 1980 (suggesting the activities became much more strongly spatially segregated), we also observe the error bars becoming much further apart.
Undertaking an in-depth study of the drivers of regional income convergence and divergence is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we believe that the SOC and OC indices could be useful additions to the current set of analytical tools available to investigate this phenomenon, complementing existing measures such as the Krugman Index of 'dissimilarity' (Krugman, 1991 (Krugman, , 1993 , which has been used to examine regional convergence in the US (Kim, 1998) and the UK (Martin et al., 2018) .
9 10 Moreover, to the extent that convergence and divergence may depend on the type of economic activities that richer and poorer states are specialised in, the metrics we have described here could be particularly advantageous.
Conclusion
This paper has used a dimension reduction algorithm, which has previously been applied to country-export data (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann et al., 2014) , to study differences in state employment concentrations over 1850-2010. This algorithm reduces the high-dimensional space of state specialisations into two single-dimension vectors that capture relative similarities in the type of economic activities states are concentrated in. In particular, the SOC index examined in this paper places states with similar occupations close together in the ranking and states with dissimilar occupations far apart. The corresponding OC index helps identify the types of occupations that distinguish states with high SOC scores from states with low SOC scores.
Despite operating only on the binary pattern of state location quotients in different occupations, we find that the resulting SOC and OC indices provide remarkably consistent insights into the types of activities distinguishing rich and poor places over the 130 year period for which state income data is available. The SOC index also outperforms measures of diversification, which become less useful in explaining differences in per capita income from 1930 onwards. It also proves to be a useful predictor of future economic growth.
While these findings align with intuition based on a two-region setting (two states with similar occupations should converge to similar levels of per capita incomes), we are not aware of any theories which explain why the linear ordering of states along the dimension captured by the SOC index should correlate so strongly with the ordering of state per capita incomes. New theories are needed to explain this robust empirical pattern.
We also find that in this particular setting, the SOC and OC indices demonstrated a unique ability to capture changing relevance of particular types of productive activities as the US economy underwent a fundamental structural shift in [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] . While this finding suggests that these metrics could provide a new analytical lens to study structural change and regional convergence patterns more generally, future work is needed to verify this in other contexts undergoing similar patterns of change. The UK regional economy could be a particularly interesting test case (Martin et al., 2018) .
Finally, we believe the bifurification of SOC and OC scores in 1980 warrants further attention. The divergence in the SOC trajectories and economic prospects of rustbelt states remains pertinently relevant today. While more research is required to understand whether the type of differences separating regions could influence a nation's capacity for inclusive growth, we believe that these new metrics could help shed light on this important question.
A Appendix

A.1 Historical State Income Data
Studying economic development over such a long stretch of history is complicated by the fact that state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is only available from 1963 onwards. For previous years, we draw on estimates of state personal income per capita. Although GDP and personal income typically show very similar trends, the measures do have some key differences in their calculation. Personal income represents the value of economic activity received by people in a given economy. It includes wages, benefits, proprietor income, dividends, interest, rent and transfer payments (such as social security). GDP represents the value added in production by the labour and capital located in a state. It is calculated by summing up a state's gross output (sales or receipts and other operating income, commodity taxes and inventory change), minus its intermediate inputs (consumption of goods and services from other US industries or imports) (Landefeld and Marcus, 2006 
A.2 Correlation between State Industrial Complexity and State Occupational Complexity Indices
In Figure 7 , we show the Pearson correlation coefficient for the relationship between the SIC and SOC indices for the period 1880-2010. Throughout this period, these measures are very strongly correlated, suggesting that states that have similar occupational structures also have similar industrial structures. 
A.3 Aggregation of 3-digit IPUMS Occupations and Industries to broad categories
Analysing the OC and IC scores for detailed occupations and industries over such a long time horizon is complicated by changes occurring in the harmonised classification scheme in 1950-1960, and 1990-2000 . As 3-digit occupation and industry codes across classifications are not directly comparable over these periods, we construct broader classification groupings, and arrive at the results in Figure 3 and Figure 11 by calculating the average OC scores of 3-digit occupations falling into these broader groups over time.
For occupations, we primarily construct the broad 'Production', 'Services' and 'Professional, Technical and Finance' groupings for the OCC1950, OCC1990 and OCC2010 classifications by drawing on each 3-digit occupation's more aggregated 2-digit occupation, and then further aggregating the relevant 2-digit occupations into the relevant broad groupings. However, in some cases the 2-digit categories do not perfectly align with the broader grouping. For example in the OCC1950 classification, most occupation categories receiving the 2-digit category 'Professional, Technical' are assigned to the 'Professional, Technical and Finance' Group.
However, although the 3-digit occupations 'Religious workers' and 'Music teachers' are assigned to the 'Professional, Technical' category, we assign these occupations to the Services category. We undertake a very similar procedure for grouping IND1950, IND1990 and IND2010 3-digit occupations into the broad industry categories shown in Figure 11 . Crosswalk files specifying the treatment of each 3-digit occupation and industry code are available on request.
A.4 Additional analysis and robustness tests for the OC index
In this section, we examine the relationship between the occupational OC index and occupational wage, educational requirements and total employment over time.
We also test whether the relationship between the OC index and the occupational OccY measure is robust to a series of control variables.
The strong tendency for SOC and OC to correlate with income-related measures does lead one to question whether we could just be capturing wage-related effects associated with occupations. To test this, we draw on IPUMS occupational earnings variables and examine the relationship between an occupation's median wage and its complexity score. As we have three different occupational classifications relating to 1950, 1990 and 2010 occupational codes, we test the relationship for each classification year. 11 As shown in Figure 8 , we find a fairly weak positive relationship between occupational earnings and OC scores, suggesting that our complexity measures are capturing more than general wage effects. Since our SOC and OC measures are based on employment concentrations in each state, it could also be the case that we are capturing effects related to the sheer number of people employed in different occupations. As such, we investigate the relationship between the total number of people employed in each occupation and its complexity score in Figure 9 . Again, we find limited evidence that OC scores are capturing effects associated with the quantity of people employed in each occupation category. Interestingly in 1950 (the first year that educational attainment data is available), we find no correlation between an occupation's OC score and its associated educational requirements. However, in more recent years we find that OC is more strongly positively correlated with occupational education requirements, suggesting that over time, OC and skill content have become more closely aligned.
As a final robustness test, we examine how the relationship between OC and OccY changes when we control for each occupation's earnings, employment and educational requirements. As the occupation classification changes in 1950, 1990 and 2010, we cannot undertake a panel regression, but instead estimate a regression model for each classification year:
where wage i relates to the standardised median income earned by a given occupation, edu i relates to the percentage people in each occupation category that have completed more than 1 year of college, lemp i represents the log of the number of people employed in each occupation and u i represents the error term.
12 EDSCOR50 and EDSCOR90 are IPUMS variables relating to the percentage of people in each occupation category that have completed at least one year of college in 1950 and 1990. EDSCOR is not available for 2010, so we use 2010 census data to calculate the percentage of people in each occupational category that have completed at least one year of college
We present the results of these regressions in Table 5 . Model (1) and (2) relate to the 1950 classification scheme and compare the change in the OC variable's explanatory power when we introduce earnings, employment and education controls. Model (3) and (4) similarly make comparisons for the 1990 classification while Model (5) and (6) relate to the 2010 classification. In all cases, the OC index accounts for the overriding majority of explained variance in occupational income content.
A.5 Robustness of Structural Change Pattern
In this section, we further scrutinize the observed shift in the OC scores over the 1970-1980 period.
First we test whether the distinct change in the OC scores are also present in the industrial complexity indices based on state industrial employment concentrations. Figure 11 shows the average IC scores for 3-digit industries falling into broad categories over time. Here we find a very similar pattern -with the average IC of manufacturing industries falling significantly and the average IC of information and communication industries experiencing a marked rise. The average IC scores of Professional, scientific, technical and financial industries also increase over this period, though not as sharply as information and communication industries. In Figure 12 , we examine whether this change also occurs if we calculate the OC metrics for metro-level regions rather than state level. While metro-level data was only available from 1970 onwards at the time of writing, we again find a similar change occurring over the 1970-1980 period, suggesting that the dynamics are not an artefact of using state-level data. (Ruggles et al., 2017) , which at the time of writing was only available from 1970 onwards Finally, we investigate whether the observed structural shift in OC scores can be accounted for by the change in employment shares of these broad categories over time. In Figure 13 , Panel A shows the employment shares falling into the occupational broad categories and Panel B shows the employment shares falling into the industrial broad categories. While we do observe a decline in employment in Production and Manufacturing categories, and a rise in both services and professional, technical and finance employment, the changes occur relatively steadily over the studied time period. These smoother changes do not account for the distinct shift in OC and IC scores observed over the 1970-1980 period. To summarise, these results suggest that the observed OC dynamics over the 1970-1980 period are not just an artefact of using occupation or state level data. Moreover, they cannot be well accounted for by changes in employment shares over time.
A.6 Tradable and Non-Tradable Analysis
Distinguishing between tradable and non-tradable industries or occupations is a notoriously imprecise activity. A number of approaches aim to use an activity's geographical concentration as a proxy for its 'tradability' (Porter, 2003; Jensen and Kletzer, 2010; Spence and Hlatshwayo, 2012) . The key intuition is that traded activities tend to either take advantage of increasing returns to scale or particular inputs such as natural resources or particular types of skills, while non-traded activities tend to be more equally distributed across space, or at least "follow the geographical distribution of the goods-producing population" (Krugman, 1991, p 65) .
We apply a similar approach that also draws on the work of Youn et al. (2016) who examined the tendency for the number of establishments in different industries (which tends to be closely correlated to employment) to systematically change with city size. They noted that non-tradable activities tended to scale linearly (i.e increase in a linear proportion) with a place's population, while tradable activities either scaled sub-linearly (such as agriculture, mining and utilities) or super-linearly (such as professional, scientific and technical and managerial services). Along these lines, a very simple approach for classifying tradable and non-tradable activities is just to measure the extent to which employment in a given activity is linearly correlated with population.
In Table 6 , we show the top 20 and bottom 20 occupations ranked by the R-squared for the relationship between employment in an occupation and total population across states for the year 2010. Top ranked occupations closely align with what one would intuitively expect to be non-traded activities, while bottom ranked occupations tend to relate to more tradable manufacturing or agricultural activities.
In Figure 14 we plot the R-squared values for each occupation falling into a particular 2-digit classification and in Figure 15 we show a histogram of the entire distribution of R-squared values across occupations in 2010.
Selecting an appropriate cut-off (in this case, the appropriate R-squared value) to distinguish between a traded and non-traded activity is always relatively ad-hoc (Jensen and Kletzer, 2010) . As shown in the histogram in Figure 15 , a significant proportion of occupations tend to have a R-squared values greater than 0.8, with a long tail of occupations having lower R-squared values. But it is difficult to justify a threshold of 0.8 over 0.7 or 0.9.
The key purpose of this exercise is to determine whether the SOC indices perform better (in terms of more accurately distinguishing between rich and poor places) when non-traded activities are removed. As such, we experiment with three different thresholds (0.7, 0.8 and 0.9) and compare them to the original dataset, where all occupations are included. Specifically, we construct three modified W matrices of binary state occupational employment concentrations in which occupations which have an R-squared greater than the given threshold are omitted. We then calculate new SOC indices on the basis of each modified W matrix and examine the correlation between the resulting SOC index and log income per capita across states. Figure 16 compares the Pearson R correlation coefficient for the relationship between state income per capita and the new SOC indices calculated for each threshold. We find that the correlation coefficient is highest for the SOC index calculated on the basis of all occupations, and declines as we remove additional occupations in accordance with the given thresholds. This indicates that the SOC index is better able to distinguish between rich and poor places when non-tradable occupations are considered. 
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A.7 Comparisons to the Krugman Index
Some studies have utilised the Krugman Index of 'dissimilarity' (Krugman, 1991 (Krugman, , 1993 to examine regional convergence in the US (Kim, 1998) and the UK (Martin et al., 2018) . This index quantifies the difference in economic structure between one region s and another region s * by summing up the differences in their employment shares across sectors and is given by
where s i represents the employment share of region s in sector i.
While this would generate N ×N pairwise comparisons for N regions, the index can also be calculated by comparing each region's employment share s i to the national average employment share in sector i. In Figure 17 , we apply both versions of the Krugman Index to state employment shares over the 1850-2010 period. The orange line shows the average of pair-wise state dissimilarities calculated for each year, while the blue line shows the average of state-dissimilarities to the national average occupational structure. With the exception of a peak in dissimilarity in 2000, the measures have shown a declining trend since 1870, suggesting that the distribution of state employment shares have becoming more similar over time. In Panel B, we calculate the Krugman Index (based on state comparisons to the national average employment share) for the same broad occupational categories shown in Figure 3 .
While the same peak occurs in 2000, the trends suggest that states are more dissimilar in relation to production-related occupations, followed by high-skill service professions followed by other services. The decreasing trend in production-related occupations has slowed over time, while the trend for high-skill service professions has been slowly increasing.
While the Krugman Index provides a useful indication of the convergence in distributions of state employment shares, we suggest that the metrics described in this paper could provide an additional complementary lens on the changing nature of regional employment concentrations.
